Secretary of War Pete Hegseth was prepared to announce a sweeping reduction of U.S. forces in Europe at a meeting in Brussels last month, until the plan was pulled at the last minute after senior White House officials reviewed it, the Daily Caller News Foundation reported, citing Wall Street Journal reporting sourced to people familiar with the matter.
The proposal was shared with Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio and other unnamed senior officials before it was nixed. Neither the Pentagon nor the White House responded to requests for comment.
The cancellation raises a pointed question: What exactly was Hegseth planning to announce, and why did the administration's own national-security leadership shut it down? The answer matters because the broader drawdown of American forces from Europe has been underway since May, and the status of billions of dollars in planned equipment withdrawals is now unclear.
The cancelled Brussels announcement did not emerge from a vacuum. Proposed cuts to U.S. troop strength in Europe have been trickling into effect since mid-May, when a Department of War press release confirmed the total number of brigade combat teams on the continent had been reduced from four to three. Each brigade combat team fields more than 4,000 soldiers along with artillery and heavy weapons.
Two days later, on May 21, President Trump posted on Truth Social that the United States would send an additional 5,000 troops to Poland, tying the move to the election of Polish President Karol Nawrocki:
"Based on the successful Election of the now President of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, who I was proud to Endorse, and our relationship with him, I am pleased to announce that the United States will be sending an additional 5,000 Troops to Poland. Thank you for your attention to this matter."
That pledge sat alongside a very different set of decisions elsewhere in Europe. The Washington Examiner reported that Hegseth ordered roughly 5,000 troops withdrawn from Germany, out of approximately 36,000 stationed there, with the drawdown expected to take six to twelve months. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell described the move as following "a thorough review of the Department's force posture in Europe." The withdrawal was directly linked to diplomatic friction between Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who had publicly suggested Iran was "humiliating" the United States during nuclear negotiations.
Trump also floated expanding troop drawdowns to Italy and Spain, calling Spain "absolutely horrible" and saying Italy "has not been of any help to us."
The concrete mechanics of the drawdown became clearer when Hegseth signed a memo directing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to move a brigade combat team out of Europe. That order triggered the cancellation of 4,000 troops from the Army's 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, who had been slated to deploy to Poland, AP News reported. A missile battalion deployment to Germany was also scrapped.
Pentagon spokesman Joel Valdez said the decision "follows a comprehensive, multilayered process." Gen. Christopher LaNeve, the Army chief of staff, told reporters he had worked with Hegseth "in close consultation of what that force unit would be, and it made the most sense for that brigade to not do its deployment in theater."
The reductions would bring the U.S. military presence in Europe back to pre-2022 levels, before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
That fact alone drew sharp bipartisan criticism. Republican Rep. Don Bacon called the decision "reprehensible" and described it as "an embarrassment to our country what we just did to Poland." Polish officials and U.S. military personnel were reportedly caught off guard by the abruptness of the shift.
Hegseth has faced scrutiny on multiple fronts during his tenure. He has reshaped Pentagon leadership with a series of personnel moves, including forcing out the top U.S. Army general in Europe, decisions that carry added weight now that the European force posture is in flux.
The troop numbers are only part of the picture. On June 17, Reuters reported that the Department of War was planning to pull an estimated $50 billion in equipment from Europe. The scope was staggering: one-third of F-15 and F-15E fighter jets, a fifth of KC-135 and KC-46 refueling aircraft, half of MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper drones, half of strategic bombers and aircraft carriers, nearly half of maritime patrol aircraft and destroyers, and the only cruise missile-laden submarine in the theater.
Whether those equipment withdrawals are still proceeding, paused, or cancelled in light of the scrapped Brussels announcement remains unclear. The gap between what has already been set in motion and what was apparently pulled back at the last minute is the central unanswered question.
The Department of War's willingness to reverse course under pressure is not unprecedented, but the stakes here are of a different magnitude entirely.
The internal debate over European troop levels is playing out against a volatile backdrop. On May 23, Ukrainian forces attacked a dormitory in Russian-held Luhansk. Russia's human rights commissioner, Yana Lantratova, was cited by Reuters regarding the strike. The next day, Russia retaliated with a barrage that included at least one Oreshnik missile, 600 strike drones, and 90 air-, sea-, and ground-launched missiles, concentrated on Kyiv.
Philip Pilkington, a former senior researcher at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, told the Daily Caller News Foundation that the use of an Oreshnik near Kyiv marked a significant shift:
"These [strikes] were concentrated in Kyiv, and the really big deal was that they used at least one Oreshnik, possibly two. Now they've used that before in the East against a factory... that was engaged in missile production or jet engine production, but the fact that they used an Oreshnik in Western Ukraine, near to Kyiv, was kind of a big deal."
Pilkington described the broader pattern in blunt terms:
"Russia is clearly moving up the escalation ladder... that's what that is. The Russians could have done this strike a year ago, they could have done it 18 months ago, and they're doing it now because they see it as climbing one rung up the escalation ladder."
Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate is floating continued intelligence support to Ukraine through Section 1223 of the proposed 2027 National Defense Authorization Act. The provision would require the Secretary of Defense to "provide intelligence support, including information, intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under title 10, United States Code, to the Government of Ukraine for the purpose of supporting military operations of the Government of Ukraine that are intended to defend and retake the territory of Ukraine." That language covers not just defense but operations aimed at retaking territory, including, potentially, Crimea and Luhansk.
The NDAA itself sits on unstable footing due to what the Daily Caller described as "drama on Capitol Hill," though the specific disputes were not detailed.
The administration's posture on European force levels now presents a confusing picture. Trump pledged 5,000 additional troops to Poland. Hegseth ordered 5,000 withdrawn from Germany. The Department of War cut a brigade combat team. The Pentagon planned to pull $50 billion in hardware. And then Hegseth's broader announcement, whatever it contained, was cancelled before he could deliver it in Brussels.
No official explanation for the cancellation has been offered. Rubio's role in reviewing and apparently blocking the plan has not been publicly addressed by either the State Department or the White House. The Pentagon's silence on the matter speaks for itself.
Hegseth has drawn no shortage of attention during his time leading the Department of War, from media fixation on his public persona to substantive policy battles. But the question of how many American troops stand between NATO allies and a Russian military that is openly climbing the escalation ladder is not a matter of personality or optics.
Sen. Thom Tillis has previously suggested that Hegseth's missteps have weakened his standing relative to other administration figures. Whether the Brussels reversal reflects a course correction driven by sound strategic judgment or an internal power struggle over the direction of American defense policy is a question the administration owes the public, and its allies, a straight answer on.
When Russia is firing hypersonic missiles at Kyiv and the Senate is drafting legislation to help Ukraine retake occupied territory, the last thing American credibility needs is a defense posture that changes depending on who in the White House reads the memo last.
